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Abstract
Mixed public-private finance is widespread in health care systems internationally. In one
variant of mixed finance, some countries (e.g., Germany) allow eligible beneficiaries to fully
exit from the public (social insurance) system and purchase private insurance. Using a con-
trolled laboratory experiment, we empirically investigate the predictions of a political econ-
omy model of mixed systems of public and private finance with two types of exit: universal-
exit, when all individuals can choose to exit the public system, and conditional-exit, when
only individuals with an income at or above a threshold income level can choose to exit.
We find that high-income individuals are less likely to exit under universal-exit than under
conditional-exit, despite having the same incentive to exit in both treatments. Sensitiv-
ity treatments suggests that a number of factors may be at play in explaining this result,
including learning effects, a priming effect and a framing effect, but that other-regarding
preferences do not appear to be an important factor.
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1 Introduction
Mixed public and private finance is widespread in health systems internationally. Public
finance predominates in most countries (even in the US if tax expenditures associated with
the tax treatment of private health care insurance are included), while private finance plays
a variety of (often controversial) roles that depend on the design of the financing system.
Private finance can complement or substitute for public finance. Complementary private
finance arises in all countries and includes, for instance, private insurance for services not
covered by the public plan or private purchases to “top-up” public coverage (e.g., privately
purchasing physiotherapy visits or home care beyond the amount covered by the public plan).
Private finance as a substitute for public finance take two basic forms: “opt-out,” whereby
an individual purchases duplicate private insurance for publicly insured services while still
contributing taxes to support the public system, and “exit,” whereby an individual wholly
withdraws from the public system, forfeiting both the right to obtain public care and the
obligation to contribute to financing the public plan. Opting-out is allowed in most countries
and plays a large role in countries such as Australia, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland. Exit is
less common, but played a prominent role in the Netherlands prior to its 2006 reforms, is a
prominent feature of the German system of health care financing, and plays a smaller role
in countries such as Austria. Germany and Austria provide a conditional-exit option: only
those individuals who satisfy specified conditions can choose to exit, though the conditions
differ by country. Germany specifies an income condition whereby only those with an annual
income greater than the specified threshold (e54,900 in 2015) are eligible to exit the public
system. In contrast, Austria specifies an occupation-based condition whereby only certain
self-employed professionals are eligible to exit.
Mixed systems of public and private finance characterized by one or more of top-up, opt-
out or exit are not unique to health care. They also exist for other publicly provided private
goods such as education, social services and garbage collection. For this reason, they have
been the focus of considerable theoretical analysis and, increasingly, empirical investigation
(e.g., Cohen-Zada and Justman 2003; Bearse et al. 2013). The standard theoretical political
economy models (e.g., Stiglitz 1974; Epple and Romano 1996a, 1996b; Gouveia 1997; Glomm
and Ravikumar 1998) focus on only two types of private finance options noted above—top-up
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and opt-out—both of which require individuals to continue to finance public provision of the
good even while privately topping up or opting out. More recently, Myers and Lülfesmann
(2009) consider the case in which any household, regardless of income, can choose to exit
the public system. Such an option can be characterized as universal-exit. Such theoretical
models provide valuable insight into outcomes under mixed systems of finance, but given the
controversy regarding mixed public and private finance in sectors such as health care, it is
important to empirically test the predictions of these models.
In this paper, we modify the political economy models of mixed financing of private goods
to allow for either a universal-exit option or a conditional-exit option and use controlled
laboratory experiments to empirically investigate the predictions of these two exit models.
Our objectives are to test the predictions of these political economy models in a controlled
laboratory environment, including both non-health and health frames and, based on the
observed outcomes, draw implications for mixed systems of health care finance.
In the standard top-up and opt-out models, uniform public provision of a private good
is financed with a proportional income tax. Individuals first vote on the proportional tax
rate, which establishes the level of public provision of the good, and then decide whether
and how much of the good to purchase privately in addition to, or in place of, the public
provision. Regardless of their private purchases decision, individuals continue to finance
public provision. Buckley et al. (2015) investigate the behavioral predictions of such top-up
and opt-out models. This paper extends this previous work to consider an environment
in which individuals can exit the public system, withdrawing their financial contributions
while obtaining the good privately. Allowing for a universal-exit option is predicted to result
in a complete unraveling of the public system as all individuals, save the lowest income
individual, will have incentive to exit. Under conditional-exit, which limits the exit option to
high-income individuals only, those with high incomes are predicted to exit and consequently
the per-capita level of public provision will be below that provided in the absence of an exit
option.
To test these theoretical predictions of mixed systems of finance with exit options, we use
controlled laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments are well suited for empirically
testing predictions of such models, and are especially important given that observational
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data are often either not available or are ill-suited for such testing. While our baseline
experiment uses a neutral investment decision-making context, we also provide a sensitivity
analysis comparing these experimental results to sessions run with an explicit health care
frame.1 Our experiments include three financing configurations: public-finance-only, mixed
financing with universal-exit, and mixed financing with conditional-exit. The design uses
a combination of within-subject and between-subject designs. All subjects experience a
baseline treatment of ten periods of a public-only financing system, followed by ten periods
in one of the two mixed systems with exit (universal-exit or conditional-exit). Comparison of
the baseline public-finance-only scheme and each of the two mixed financing schemes relies
on within-subject variation, while the comparison of the two mixed financing schemes relies
on between-subject variation. Any ordering/persistence effect is addressed by reversing the
ordering of the public-only and mixed financing (with exit) treatment pairings so that half
the subjects experience the mixed financing system first, followed by the public-finance-only
treatment. In each decision period of all treatments individuals are assigned an exogenous
income. In the public-only treatment individuals must choose their preferred proportional
income tax rate. In the exit treatments individuals who are permitted to exit must choose
whether to exit. If they choose to exit, they then have to choose the amount of the private
good they will consume. All individuals who do not exit (either by choice or design) must
choose their preferred proportional income tax rates. The proportional tax rate used to
finance the public provision of the private good is determined by the median tax rate among
the preferred rates submitted by the participants in a laboratory session. This captures
the outcome of commonplace majority-rule voting due to the median voter theorem, which
states that when individuals have single-peaked preferences a majority-rule voting system
will result in the outcome most preferred by the median voter (Black, 1948).
The experimental results reveal some noteworthy differences in behavior under the differ-
ent exit options. First, we find that in the conditional-exit treatment both the exit behavior
of high-income individuals and the tax rates selected by those who remain in the public sys-
tem are consistent with the theoretical predictions. In the universal-exit treatment, however,
high-income individuals are less likely to exit than predicted by theory and consequently,
1Ahlert, Felder, and Vogt (2012) and Kesternich, Schumacher, and Winter (2015) also investigate health
versus neutral framing of experiments, although neither study focuses on health care finance.
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more people contribute to public provision of the private good than is predicted. Even though
the incentives for high-income individuals to exit are identical under both the universal and
income-conditional schemes, high-income individuals are less likely to exit when the exit
option is universal. Making exit conditional on high-income appears to give the high-income
individuals “permission” to exit. Attempts to identify the source of differences in behavior
by high-income individuals under the two schemes suggest that a number of factors may be
at play including learning effects and a type of priming effect, but other-regarding preferences
do not appear to be an important factor. Also, tax- and exit-rate decisions are found to be
more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the decision-making environment is
framed in terms of health care rather than a neutral investment decision.
In the next section, we outline our theoretical framework. In Section 3, we describe the
laboratory implementation of the theoretical framework and present our main experimental
results in Section 4. We then discuss subjects’ observed exit behavior in Section 5 and
present results on health care framing effects in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Theoretical Framework
We develop a simple discrete version of a commonly used majority-rule voting model of
tax-financed public provision of a private good (see e.g., Glomm et al. 2011) that allows
for an exit option.2 There are N individuals or households who differ in their fixed income
(or endowment of a numeraire consumption good) denoted by y. The mean income in the
population is ȳ, the median income, ym, and the median is assumed to be less than the
mean. Households have preferences over consumption of a numeraire good, given by c, and
of a specific private good that may be publicly provided or purchased privately, given by H.
Household preferences are represented by the following utility function:3
U(c,H) = acη + bHη (1)
2These standard political economy models typically assume a continuous population distribution and
general individual preferences. To implement the theoretical environment in a laboratory setting we adopt
a discrete income distribution and a specific utility function to obtain closed-form solutions.
3The specific utility function and the assumed parameter values we use are based on Buckley et al. (2015).
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where a, b > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1). The private good H is produced using the numeraire good.
Following the literature, it takes one unit of the numeraire good to produce one unit of H
independent of whether H is publicly or privately financed.
Consider first the decision of a household who chooses to exit the public system. Because
the household is not financing the public provision of the private good and is financing its
own consumption of the private good, the household maximizes (1) subject to the following
budget constraint4
c+ h = y (2)
where h denotes the amount of H purchased privately. This problem yields the household’s





where φ = (a/b)
1
1−η > 0 and h′(y) > 0.
Theoretical Prediction 1 For households that choose to exit the public system, their opti-
mal purchases of the private good will be given by (3) and will be increasing in their income.
Next we characterize the public system and exit behavior in each of the three treatments
we consider: public finance only, mixed financing with a universal-exit option, and mixed
financing with a conditional-exit option.
2.1 Public Finance Only
In a public-only finance system, the provision of H is financed solely through a proportional
income tax, denoted by t which is determined by majority-rule. The government provides a
uniform amount of the private good, denoted by gH , to each household. The government’s
budget constraint is
tȳ = gH . (4)
4The household’s problem is well-behaved.
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Using the government’s budget constraint (4), the household’s budget constraint can be
written as
c = y − (y/ȳ)gH (5)
where T (y) = y/ȳ is the household’s relative tax price for the private good.
Substituting the household’s budget constraint (5) into (1) with H = gH , yields the
household’s induced utility function over the public provision of the private good
V (g) ≡ max
gH≥0
a(y − T (y)gH)η + bgηH (6)
which is strictly concave in gH . Therefore, each household has a unique preferred level of
public provision, denoted by gH(y), and a unique preferred tax rate, denoted by t(y), which
are both strictly decreasing in household income. It follows directly from the median voter
theorem that the equilibrium outcome under majority rule will be given by the preferred tax












1−η + T (ym)
. (8)
Theoretical Prediction 2 In a public-only financing system, preferred tax rates are strictly
decreasing in income and the equilibrium outcome with majority-rule will be determined by
the preferred tax rate of the median-income household.
In a public-only financing system, all households receive the same amount of H, but face
different relative tax prices for the private good that are increasing in income. The household
with the mean income faces the same price for the private good whether the good is financed
publicly or privately. Consequently, public provision of the good effectively redistributes
resources from households with incomes above the mean (who face higher relative tax prices)
to households with incomes below the mean (who face lower relative tax prices).
Now consider what happens to the public provision of the private good when households
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can choose to not pay taxes to finance the public provision of H, and instead purchase H
privately. We consider two cases: universal-exit and conditional-exit.
2.2 Mixed Financing: Universal-Exit Option
Consider first the universal-exit option in which all households can choose to exit. A house-
hold who exits the public system pays no taxes to support public provision and has its full
income available when choosing how much of H to purchase privately. The timing of this
treatment is as follows:
1. Households decide whether to exit the public system. Households who choose not to
exit the public system vote on the level of public provision, i.e., vote on the proportional
income tax to be applied to all those households who remain in the public system. The
voting outcome is determined by majority rule.
2. Households who exit choose how much H to purchase privately.
Only households who have chosen to remain in the public system are allowed to vote for the
public tax rate.5 Since households who exit do not pay any taxes, they should be indifferent
across all possible tax rates. Allowing these households to vote on the tax rate could result
in a situation in which a majority-preferred tax rate does not reflect the preferences of the
households that remain in the public system, to which the tax rate applies. Second, house-
holds vote on the tax rate before knowing which households have exited; that is, households
play a simultaneous-move game.
Public provision redistributes income from high- to low-income households. Therefore,
the highest-income household is worse off in a public system than in a private-finance only
system. Hence, the highest-income household has a strictly dominant strategy to exit. Con-
sider the next highest income household. Recognizing that the highest-income household
will exit, this household now also has a strictly dominant strategy to exit the public system.
By the continued iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, all households, except
5An example of a situation in which those who exit are removed from voting is provided by the Canada
Elections Act, which currently prohibits Canadian citizens who have lived abroad for more than five years
from participating in Canadian federal elections.
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the household with the lowest income (denoted by ymin), will choose to exit the public sys-
tem. The lowest-income household will be indifferent between exiting or not since a public
system with only one household is equivalent to a private-finance only system. The amount
of private good consumed by each household will be given by (3). Allowing for universal-exit
is predicted to result in a system of private-finance only.
Theoretical Prediction 3 In a mixed financing system with an universal-exit option, all
households will choose to exit except the lowest-income household, who will be indifferent
between exiting and not exiting.
2.3 Mixed Financing: Conditional-Exit Option
Consider a conditional-exit option that allows a household to exit the public system only
if the household’s income is above a specified income threshold. The timing of the exit
decision is the same as in the universal-exit treatment, but only those with incomes above
the threshold can choose to exit. It is straightforward to see that again by iterated deletion
of dominated strategies all households with incomes at or above the threshold will optimally
exit. The public system will consist of all households with incomes below the threshold
income level, denoted by N̂ < N , and the analysis of this public system is the same as the
one described in section 2.1 with N replaced by N̂ . Again, privately purchased amounts of
H by those who exit the public system are given by (3).
Theoretical Prediction 4 In a mixed financing system with an income-conditioned exit
option, all those households with income above the income threshold will exit the public
system. The equilibrium tax rate in the public system will be determined by the preferred
tax rate of the household with the median income among those households remaining in the
public system.
In summary, under public-only finance all individuals will be in the public system, under
universal-exit there is predicted to be only private provision and under conditional-exit high-
income individuals are predicted to be in the private system and low-income individuals are
predicted to be in the public system. Thus, the alternative systems of finance considered are
expected to give rise to differing demands for H. In Section 5, we discuss the predicted total
demand for H under the different financing systems given the specific parameter values we
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implement in the experiment.6
3 Laboratory Implementation
We use a controlled laboratory experiment to test the above theoretical predictions regard-
ing the equilibrium outcomes of majority-rule voting over the tax-financed public provision
of a private good under public-only financing and mixed financing with either a universal-
exit option or with a conditional-exit option. Following standard experimental economic
methodology, household or individual decision-makers, i.e., subjects, in the experiment are
incentivized with real monetary payoffs. The main experiment is framed in an investment
context to reflect the neutral consumption setting of the theoretical models of public provi-
sion of private goods and a context that is commonly used in the experimental economics
literature (Alm and Jacobson 2007). Subject decisions are framed as choices over how much
to invest in alternative investment funds, including a collective group fund and an individ-
ual private fund. We recognize that a decision made between an individual fund and a
group fund is not strictly neutral (Dufwenberg et al., 2011), but this terminology is used
to facilitate subject comprehension of the decision-making environment. The impact of a
neutral investment frame rather than a health care frame is tested by comparing results from
the neutral investment frame sessions with results from sessions that use an explicit health
care frame. This sensitivity analysis is presented in Section 6 below. The complete set of
instructions used in the experiment can be found in the Appendix.
Each session was run with ten subjects who were told that they would be randomly
assigned to be a member of a group of five people, but were not told who was in their group.
Each group remained together through the session (following Buckley et al., 2015, Kroll et
al., 2007 and Margrieter et al., 2005) so that the two groups in each session represented
independent observations. Subjects were told that, at the beginning of each decision period,
each member of their group would randomly be assigned an income, expressed in laboratory
dollars (L$), from the following set of five income levels (125, 275, 640, 700, 1500), and that
6Following the literature we assume that provision of H is subject to constant marginal costs. This
assumption could be relaxed to incorporate increasing marginal costs provided that preferences remain
single-peaked in public provision and preferred public provision is decreasing in income. Total demand for
H under the different financing systems would then be affected by the assumed underlying cost function.
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each individual would be assigned each of the income levels twice over the course of the ten
periods of the treatment. The income distribution was chosen to ensure that the median
income was below the mean (consistent with the theoretical assumption).7 To keep subjects
actively thinking about their decisions, incomes were assigned in a pre-determined pseudo-
random order such that in each treatment subjects experienced each of the five income levels
in the first five periods and then again in the last five periods, but in a different order.
The effect of randomizing incomes is tested below in Section 5, which presents results from
sessions in which each subject’s income was held fixed over the entire session.
As noted earlier, the experiment used a combination of within-subject and between-
subject designs. All subjects experienced ten decision periods of a public-only financing
treatment and ten decision periods of one of the two mixed financing systems, where the
order of the two treatments (public/mixed) was randomized across experimental sessions to
control for potential order effects. Comparison of the baseline public-only financing system
and the two mixed financing systems relies on within-subject variation, while the comparison
of the two mixed financing systems (universal-exit and conditional-exit) relies on between-
subject variation.
At the beginning of each decision period of the public-only finance treatment, subjects
were told that their income must be divided between two Investment Funds: a Group Invest-
ment Fund (GIF) and a Private Investment Fund (PIF). Subjects were told that everyone
in their group must contribute the same fixed percentage of their income to the GIF and
that this percentage would be determined by the group. The total amount contributed to
the GIF would be divided into five equal shares. Each share would be invested in Market A
and the subject would earn a return from this investment. The subject’s remaining income
after contributing to the GIF would go into the subject’s PIF and be invested in Market B
where it would earn a return for the subject. The returns earned on the investments were
calculated using the payoff function given by (1), where the GIF investment in Market A
is for the private good H and the PIF investment in Market B is for the numeraire good c
with the following parameter values: a = 20, b = 22 and η = 0.6.8
7This distribution of income is roughly representative of the incomes at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and
90th percentiles in Canada in 2013.
8These parameter values were chosen to assure the saliency of subject decisions in the experiment and
are based on values used by Buckley et al. (2015).
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In each of the decision periods of the public-only treatment, subjects were asked to submit
their preferred mandatory GIF contribution rate. To replicate the outcome of majority-rule
voting in a laboratory environment, subjects were told that the submitted GIF contribution
rates would be ranked from highest to lowest and that the median contribution rate would be
implemented.9 It was explained to them why there was no incentive to submit a contribution
rate other than their preferred rate. Subjects were provided with tables and tutorial examples
to illustrate how the returns worked in the markets and an onscreen calculator that allowed
them to determine their returns in both markets as well as their total return for different
income levels and different GIF contribution rates. Subjects were able to access the calculator
throughout the session.
In the universal-exit treatment, subjects were provided the same information as in the
public-only treatment as described above, but were also told that they could decide whether
or not to participate in the group investment fund. Subjects were told that if they choose
not to participate in the GIF, then they would not make any contribution to the GIF and
would not receive any share of the GIF. The subjects would, however, be able to choose
how much of their income to invest in a different market, Market C, where the returns to
investment in Market C are the same as in Market A. Whatever amount not invested in
Market C, would then be automatically invested in Market B on behalf of the subject. The
subjects’ total returns for each period if they choose not to participate in the GIF is the
sum of the returns of their investments in Markets B and C. Subjects were told that if
they choose not to exit, everyone who remained in the GIF would be asked to submit their
preferred GIF contribution rates. The submitted GIF contribution rates would be ranked
from highest to lowest. In the case of an odd number of subjects remaining in the GIF, the
middle-ranked contribution rate would be implemented. In the case of an even number of
subjects remaining in the GIF one of the two middle-ranked submitted GIF rates would be
randomly chosen and implemented.
9Differing voting processes have been implemented experimentally. The seminal work by Fiorino and Plott
(1978) uses a sequential amendment-driven voting protocol while more recent papers use either simultaneous
voting protocols (e.g., Margreiter et al. 2005; Kroll et al. 2007) or a binary yes/no vote on a given tax
proposal (e.g. Sutter and Weck-Hannemann 2003). Another approach is to allow each individual to propose
a tax rate and to implement the median tax rate (e.g. Buckley et al., 2015; Norton and Isaac, 2013). We
adopt the latter voting process since it most closely resembles the theoretical environment that was being
implemented in the lab.
11
The conditional-exit treatment was described similarly to the universal-exit treatment
except only subjects with the two highest income levels (700, 1500) were given the choice
of participating in or exiting from the GIF. Subjects with incomes of 125, 275 and 640
automatically remained in the GIF. At the end of each of the ten periods of both exit
treatments, all subjects were told the total number of subjects who participated in the GIF,
the implemented GIF contribution rate, the total amount contributed to the GIF, their own
investments and returns in Markets A and B (if the subjects participated in the GIF) or in
Markets C and B (if the subjects did not participate in the GIF) and finally their own total
returns for the period.
In both exit treatments, each subject was provided with examples to illustrate how her
returns were determined depending on which subjects participated in the GIF, including
the cases when all subjects participated in the GIF, the subject remained in the GIF but
other subjects exited, and when the subject herself exited the GIF. Subjects were also given
a tutorial in the use of an onscreen calculator that allowed them to determine their total
returns for different income levels, GIF contribution rates, and different exit decisions made
by themselves and others. Subjects were given a few minutes to practice using the calculator
and were able to access the calculator whenever they were asked to make a decision.
All subjects were recruited using an online recruitment system for controlled laboratory
experiments (ORSEE, Greiner 2015) and the experiment was administered in the McMaster
Experimental Economics Laboratory. Our main experimental design involves five groups of
five subjects each experiencing one of the following treatment pairs: public-only followed
by universal-exit, universal-exit followed by public-only, public-only followed by conditional-
exit and conditional-exit followed by public-only. Additional treatments were also run as
part of a sensitivity analysis. Each session had twenty decision periods (ten decision periods
for each treatment) and lasted approximately 70 minutes.10 The average subject payoff
was $23 including a $5 show-up fee. Subjects were individually paid their cash earnings in
private. The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) and the
laboratory protocol was approved by the McMaster University Research Ethics Board. Table
10All treatments used a repeated game design for the 20 periods, so decisions made in any one period did
not have consequences for other periods. For example, if a subject exited in period 12, in period 13 they
faced a new decision whether to exit.
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1 summarizes the experimental design for all treatments presented below.
4 Experimental Results
We begin by testing for learning effects between the first five decision periods and the sec-
ond five decision periods of the main design presented in Table 1 with respect to the mean
implemented GIF rate (hereafter referred to as the tax rate), the subjects’ mean exit deci-
sions and the mean private purchases of those who choose to exit for each ordering of the
treatments: public-only followed by one of the two exit treatments and one of the two exit
treatments followed by the public-only treatment. There is evidence of marginal learning
effects with respect to the mean implemented GIF rate when the universal-exit treatment
was experienced first.11 We next test for order effects to determine if there are any differ-
ences in the mean implemented GIF rates, mean exit decisions, and mean private purchases
depending on whether the universal-exit treatment or the conditional-exit treatment appears
first or second in the session. Our tests show no evidence of order effects.12 For the analysis
presented below we focus on the last five decision periods of each treatment to account for
any marginal learning effects.
We create an independent observation for each group of five subjects in each session of
each treatment by computing the mean value across the last five decision periods for each of
the mean implemented tax rate, mean exit decisions and mean private purchases. Because
there are no order effects, this provides 10 independent observations of each variable for
the following treatments: public-only (paired with universal-exit), public-only (paired with
conditional-exit), universal-exit and conditional-exit. Any differences from null hypotheses
are judged statistically significant if the p-value is not greater than the significance level
11As the same subjects make decisions in both the first- and second-half of each treatment, we use a
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to obtain five independent observations for each treatment. We
cannot reject the null hypotheses that there are no differences in the mean implemented GIF rates, subjects’
mean exit decisions or mean private purchases of those who choose to exit between the first five and the
last five periods of each treatment when the public-finance-only treatment was seen first. We also conducted
parametric paired t-tests and found similar results. Comparisons between within-subject treatments reported
in subsections 4.1 to 4.6 below also use these same non-parametric and parametric significance tests.
12Because ordering of treatments was varied between subjects, the mean observations are independent; we
therefore test for order effects using both Mann-Whitney and Fisher-Pitman Randomization nonparametric
tests (Moir, 1998). The p-values are all above 0.10 and we cannot reject the null hypotheses of no differences
in these mean outcomes across the three treatments. These results are also supported by parametric t-tests.
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of 0.10. All hypothesis tests are conducted using parametric paired or unpaired t-tests
(as appropriate) and non-parametric Mann-Whitney or Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests (as
appropriate). We only identify the specific tests that are used if there is a difference between
the results using parametric and non-parametric tests.
4.1 Exit Decisions
Exit behavior differed substantially between the universal-exit and conditional-exit treat-
ments as shown in Tables 2 and 3. The rates of exit in the universal-exit treatment were
notably lower than predicted for all income levels, although, as expected, they were increas-
ing in income. In contrast, in the conditional-exit treatment although exit rates of 0.940 for
individuals with incomes of 700 and 1500 are statistically significantly different from a rate
of 1.000, they are quite close to the predicted value of 1.0.
In the conditional-exit treatment individuals with the two highest incomes appear to have
understood the benefit to them of exiting; in the universal-exit treatment, however, either
they did not have this same degree of understanding or, if they did, they chose not to act
on it, because individuals with incomes of 700 and 1500 had exit rates of 0.720 and 0.760
respectively. Further, given that higher-income individuals did not exit as expected, lower-
income individuals had an incentive to remain in the public system because they receive
income transfers from the higher-income individuals through the public provision of the
private good. Hence, their exit rates are low and the public system does not unravel as
predicted for the universal-exit treatment.
Result 1 Participants in the conditional-exit treatment exited as predicted but participants in
the universal-exit treatment exited less often than predicted, with higher-income individuals
exiting more frequently than lower-income individuals.
4.2 Private-Purchase Decisions
As also shown in Tables 2 and 3, the average amounts of private purchases made by subjects
who chose to exit in the universal-exit treatment track the predicted values quite well, and
none of the differences are statistically different. There is, however, a tendency for lower-
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income individuals to over-invest (by 17 and 11 percent for individuals with incomes 125
and 275 respectfully) and for higher-income individuals to under-invest (by 5 percent for
individuals with incomes 700 and 1500). For the conditional-exit treatment, individuals with
incomes of 700 or 1500 who choose to exit invest about nine percent less than predicted.
Result 2 In both of the universal- and conditional-exit treatments the private purchases
by those individuals who chose to exit are close to the amounts predicted by the theoretical
model.
4.3 Mean Preferred Tax Rates
Table 4 presents a comparison, by income, of the observed mean preferred (i.e., submitted)
tax rates and the theoretically predicted values.13 In the public-only treatment the observed
mean preferred tax rates are decreasing in income (as predicted), but they are slightly less
(by less than ten percent) than predicted for incomes 125, 275, 640 and 700 and slightly
greater (by less than ten percent) than predicted for individuals with income of 1500.14
Because the model for the universal-exit treatment predicts that individuals with income
greater than 125 will exit, there are no predicted tax rates for the universal-exit treatment,
except for the lowest-income subjects, who prefer a tax rate of 0.559 if they remain in the
public system. Many of the lowest-income subjects did remain in the public-system and
their mean submitted rate was substantially higher than the predicted value. This is not
surprising given that those with greater incomes chose not to exit and the preferred rate
is greater than 0.559 for those with income of 125 when higher-income individuals do not
exit. Analogously, the mean preferred rates reported by individuals with incomes of 275
and 640 are between the rates predicted for the public-only and conditional-exit treatments,
which is consistent with an environment in which individuals with incomes of 700 and 1500
frequently do not exit from the public system (which occurs more than a quarter of the time
in the universal-exit treatment). Overall, the behavior of participants in the universal-exit
treatment is not consistent with the theoretical predictions.
In the conditional-exit treatment, the mean preferred rates reported by the three lowest
13Statistical tests between each exit treatment and public-only finance used solely public-only data from
the paired public-only treatment.
14These comparisons pool the public-only data across the twenty groups.
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income subjects, who must remain in the public system, differ from the predicted values
by -0.033, 0.018 and 0.047, respectively. These differences are statistically significant for
incomes 125 and 640. However, for those with income of 275 (the median voter) the mean
preferred tax rate does not differ statistically from the predicted rate, which reflects in part
the fact that subjects with incomes of 700 and 1500 exit (as predicted) more than ninety
percent of the time.15
Result 3 The mean preferred tax rates for individuals in the public-only and conditional-exit
treatments are not substantially different from the rates predicted by the underlying theoretical
model. The data generated by the individuals in the universal-exit treatment do not support
the predictions of the theoretical model.
4.4 Mean Implemented Tax Rates
We now compare the observed mean implemented tax rates against the theoretically pre-
dicted values for each of the three treatments as shown in Table 5. The predicted tax rate in
the public-only treatment is 0.564 and the actual mean implemented tax rates in the public-
only treatments (when paired with either exit treatment) do not differ from this prediction.
In addition, the actual mean implemented tax rate in the conditional-exit treatment did not
differ from its predicted tax rate. In the universal-exit treatment, when all subjects can
choose to exit, there is no prediction for the tax rate as all subjects, save the lowest income
subject, are predicted to exit. If only the lowest income individual remained to participate
in the public system, then the predicted tax rate is 0.559. The actual mean implemented
tax rate in universal-exit treatment differs statistically from the predicted tax rate and is
consistent with an environment in which individuals with incomes greater than 125 choose
to participate in the public system.
We next test for differences in mean implemented tax rates across the three treatments.
There is no significant difference between the mean implemented tax rates from the public-
15Out of 100 observations of decisions made by individuals with incomes of 700 or 1500 there are only six
observations (three for individuals with income of 700 and three for individuals with income of 1500) when
the individual does not exit. The mean tax rates selected by the individuals with income of 700 and 1500 are
0.628 and 0.750. Both of these are inconsistent with these individuals attempting to maximize their payoffs
under any assumption of the mix of individuals who will remain in the public system.
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only treatments when paired with the universal-exit treatment and the public-only treat-
ments when paired with the conditional-exit treatment, and between the universal-exit and
conditional-exit treatment tax rates. However, there is a significant difference between the
universal-exit and paired public-only tax rates and between the conditional-exit and paired
public-only tax rates.
Result 4 The mean implemented tax rates in the public-only and conditional-exit treatments
are not significantly different from the rates predicted by the underlying theoretical model.
The mean implemented tax rate in the universal-exit treatment is significantly higher than
predicted.
4.5 Inequality in the Consumption of the Private Good
Distributional concerns figure prominently in the assessment of alternative systems of health
care finance. In our setting, income-related inequality in consumption (public provision
plus private purchases among those who exit) is predicted to differ substantially across the
three financing treatments (Table 6).16 Consumption is predicted to be equal across income-
groups under public-only financing, to exhibit a strong pro-rich gradient under universal-
exit, and to exhibit a stepped pro-rich pattern under conditional-exit (equal consumption
among the three lower income groups and then higher consumption among the two high-
income groups). We measure the extent of income-related inequality in consumption using
the Concentration Index (CI), which has been applied widely within health economics to
measure income-related inequalities and inequities in health, health care consumption, and
health care financing (van Doorslaer and Van Ourti, 2011). The CI is directly analogous
to the Gini Coefficient, but instead of measuring univariate inequality (e.g., inequality in
the distribution of income in the population), it is a bi-variate measure of the extent to
which inequality in a variable of interest, in this case, consumption of the private good, is
systematically related to a second variable, in this case, income. The CI takes on values
16In contrast, the aggregate level of consumption is not predicted to not differ substantially across the
treatments and, in fact, we find no statistical differences in observed aggregate consumption of the private
good across the three treatments; nor does observed consumption differ statistically from the predicted value
for the public-only and universal-exit treatments. Consumption under conditional-exit, however, is less than
predicted because the high-income individuals who exit consume less privately than predicted.
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in the interval [0,1], is zero when there is no income-related inequality, is positive when
inequality favors the rich, and is negative when inequality favors the poor. Among our
financing treatments, income-related inequality is predicted to be least under public-only
financing and the most pro-rich under universal-exit. Because observed consumption under
the public-only treatments is equal across income levels, the CIs for public-only are zero
and do not differ from the predicted values. Pro-rich income-inequality in each of universal-
and conditional-exit is significantly different from public-only financing, and although the
CI for universal-exit is less than that for conditional-exit, the difference between the two
exit treatments is not statistically significant. The CI for universal-exit is significantly less
than its predicted value, indicating less-than-predicted income-related inequality, due to the
less-than-predicted rate of exit among high-income individuals. The CI for conditional exit
is not significantly different than its predicted value.
Result 5 Pro-rich income-related inequality in consumption of the private good is substan-
tially greater in the exit treatments than in the public-only treatment, though for the universal-
exit treatment the pro-rich inequality is less than predicted.
4.6 Inequalities in Total Payoffs
Total payoffs provide a rough measure of social welfare in our environment. The predicted
total payoffs are largest for the public-only treatment and smallest for the universal-exit
treatment, and, as with consumption, income-related inequality is predicted to be small-
est in the public-only treatment, reflecting the redistribution that occurs under public-only
financing (Table 7). As predicted, observed total payoffs are higher in the public-only treat-
ment than in either of the two exit treatments (the difference between the exit treatments is
not statistically significant). The observed total payoffs statistically differ from the predicted
values only for the conditional-exit treatment, again reflecting the under-investment by the
high-income subjects who exited. For all three treatments the observed CIs do not differ
significantly from their predicted values. As expected, the CI for public-only financing is sig-
nificantly less than that for both universal-exit and conditional-exit, although the difference
between the two mixed-financing treatments is not significant.
Result 6 The level and distribution of mean total payoffs in the public-only treatment do
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not differ from the predictions, are greater than in both exit treatments, and display less
income-related inequality than in both exit treatments.
5 Why Don’t Individuals Exit as Predicted?
The difference in subject exit behavior across the two exit treatments is surprising. As noted,
the two highest-income individuals in the conditional-exit treatment appeared to recognize
the benefits of exiting and consequently exited at rates comparable to the theoretical pre-
dictions. However, in the universal-exit treatment individuals with the same incomes exited
at rates substantially less than in conditional-exit. We offer three conjectures that might
account for this difference.
First, high-income individuals in the universal-exit treatment might not exit as predicted
due to altruism. Altruistic or cooperative preferences would be consistent with high-income
individuals staying and supporting the public system rather than exiting if they worried that
the public system would completely unravel if they exited because lower-income individuals
would have the incentive to exit once the high-income individuals exit. In contrast, altru-
istic high-income individuals would have fewer qualms about exiting in the conditional-exit
treatment knowing that middle-income individuals would have to stay and help fund the
public system and provide income transfers to the lowest-income individuals.
Second, individuals in our universal-exit treatment might not exit as predicted due to a
priming bias. That is, for reasons unrelated to altruistic preferences, high-income individuals
may not exit as predicted if they feel that the environment into which they are placed is
an environment primed with public provision.17 While the highest-income individuals may
recognize the incentive to exit, they may believe that they have an obligation to help maintain
this public system. This bias may not present itself in the conditional-exit treatment because
high-income individuals are specifically told that they alone may exit from the public system.
The conditional-exit environment grants permission for the high-income individuals to exit
while requiring the middle- and low income-individuals to participate in the public system.
Third, it may take time for individuals in the universal-exit treatment to realize that the
highest-income person should exit from the public system and that the natural consequence
17This priming bias is what van Dijk and Wilke (2000) call decision-induced focusing.
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of this is that the next-highest-income individual should then exit until the unraveling process
takes place and everyone exits. This suggests that exit rates in the universal-exit treatment
would be higher if it was easier for this unraveling process to take place faster.
We investigated all three of these conjectures. First, we investigated the possibility
that the decision to exit from the public system may be related to the cooperativeness or
altruism of the participants. Because participating in the public system results in income
redistribution from high-income participants to low-income participants, the social-value
orientations of the participants may be important. If our conjecture is true, the social-value
orientation of subjects should be related to their exit behavior.
To explore the second, we modified our design so that subjects participated in a conditional-
exit treatment for ten periods and then switched to the universal-exit treatment for another
ten periods. If our conjecture is true, exposing participants first to the conditional-exit treat-
ment will prime high-income subjects to exit more frequently in the subsequent universal-exit
treatment, thereby providing greater incentive for lower-income individuals to exit.
To examine the third conjecture, we modified our design so that each subject had one
of the five income levels for all decision periods (rather than experiencing all five income
levels in random order), thereby giving high-income subjects greater opportunity to learn
the benefits of exiting and more readily prompting the cascade of exits down the income
distribution. To test this we used the design in which subjects first participated in a public-
only treatment for ten decision periods and then universal-exit treatment for another ten
decision periods, but modified it so that individuals had the same income for all twenty
decision-periods. In a further minor variation of this, we also ran this fixed-income design
in which all subjects were told after each period which of the five subjects chose to exit,
hypothesizing that explicit information about the income levels of the individuals who exit
may affect exit behavior and may speed up the predicted cascade of exits.
Table 8 summarizes exit behavior for our original designs and our new sensitivity designs.
Column (1) presents the mean per period exit rates by income in the original conditional-
exit treatment reported in Table 3 plus the exits rates for the conditional-exit treatment
that primed the universal-exit treatment run to examine the second conjecture. Column (2)
presents the exit rates by income in the original universal-exit treatment reported in Table
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2. Column (3) presents the exit rates by income for the universal-exit treatment that was
preceded by a conditional-exit treatment and column (4) presents the exit rates by income
for the universal-exit treatment preceded by a public-only treatment but in which incomes
are not randomized after each decision period. Finally, column (5) presents the design similar
to that in column (4) only information about the income of the individuals who exited is
also provided to everyone. Data for each of the three new designs were obtained from three
sessions (i.e., nine in total), each of which included two independent groups of five subjects
who were randomly assigned to groups.
To test the first conjecture, the sessions described in columns (4) and (5) were followed
by a brief social-value-orientation ring game similar to those presented in Mentzakis and
Mestelman (2013).18 This allowed individuals to be categorized as having altruistic, cooper-
ative, individualistic or competitive other-regarding preferences based on their decisions in
the non-strategic payoff allocation ring game. We found no evidence that individuals’ exit
decisions were correlated with either a continuous or categorical measure of their social value
orientation.
However, the priming design had the expected effect on exit rates: comparing columns (1)
and (3) reveals that high-income individuals in the universal-exit treatment that followed
the conditional-exit treatment exited at rates equivalent to rates in the conditional-exit
treatments and not significantly different from their predicted values. Furthermore, the
higher rates of exit among high-income individuals cause the exit rates to increase among
those with incomes of 125, 275 and 640. These exit rates rise from 0.080, 0.160 and 0.560
to 0.160, 0.600 and 0.800 respectively (see columns (2) and (3)), although these are still
significantly below the exit prediction of 1.00. The rate of exit for all individuals who
are expected to exit rises from 55 percent in the original universal-exit treatments to a
significantly higher 80 percent in the primed universal-exit treatment.
Learning also appears to explain part of the low exit rate in the universal-exit treatments.
A comparison of columns (2) and (4) reveals that keeping subjects’ incomes constant (so high-
18While the social-value orientation game used was developed by Griesinger and Livingston (1973) and
Liebrand (1984), the exact ring game used was identical to the non-incentivized social-value-orientation
mechanism presented in Mentzakis and Mestelman (2013). The authors found no hypothetical bias when
comparing these social-value-orientation measures to those elicited when salient monetary incentives were
involved.
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income subjects more easily learn the benefits of exiting) also leads to higher rates of exit
by high-income individuals. Further providing subjects information after each period about
the incomes of those who chose to exit does not impact exit behavior as seen by comparing
columns (5) and (4).
These supplemental findings indicate that the low exit rates by high-income individuals in
the universal-exit treatment are not driven by other-regarding preferences, and likely derive
at least in part from a bias in favor of public support that may be overcome by making it clear
that exit is permitted or by providing sufficient experience in the environment so that they
may learn the individual advantage of exiting. However, these factors cannot explain all of
the differences observed between the universal-exit treatments, conditional-exit treatments
and the theoretical predictions.
6 Health Framing
The results presented above are based on sessions that use an investment context, as is com-
mon in the experimental literature for fields such as environmental economics and public
finance. While our theoretical model does not predict any behavioral differences between
alternative frames used to give a subject context, the question of whether health care fram-
ing effects might exist in our setting is an interesting one.19 To test for possible health
care framing effects, we replicated the earlier public-only, universal-exit and conditional-exit
treatments using an explicit health care frame.
These health-frame sessions simply modified the language of the experimental instruc-
tions without changing the underlying decision problem of the experiment. Specifically, the
investment frame terminology of a “Group Investment Fund” being invested in “Market A”
was changed to a “Group Health Care Fund” being deposited into a “Health Care Account”.
Additionally, the terminology of a “Private Investment Fund” being invested into “Market
B” was reworded to a “Private Fund” being invested into a “Private Investment Account”.
This modified terminology was introduced to provide subjects with a decision between an
19Harrison and List (2004) discuss the need to consider the framing context of an experiment before
drawing general conclusions because without that context the experimenter is unable to control for the
frames subjects impose themselves.
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explicitly named health care option and an explicitly named private investment option while
ensuring an identical outcome and payoff situation between the two frames.
Table 9 presents the results for the exit rate, private purchase decision, and implemented
tax rate for the health-frame sessions. The observed proportion of exits in the health-frame
universal-exit treatment was found to be significantly higher, and closer to the predicted rate
of 100%, than that observed in the neutral investment treatments. Under the health frame
subjects exhibited an increase in exit rates of more than 20 percentage points on average.
Furthermore, implemented tax rates were found to be significantly lower in health-frame
conditional-exit treatments than when neutrally framed, although on average only roughly
10 percentage points lower. However, not all relevant outcomes were found to exhibit framing
effects, as implemented tax rates under the universal-exit treatment were not found to be
significantly different from those found in the neutral-frame treatments; additionally, the
private purchase amount of those who do exit in the health frame were also not found to
be significantly different from their neutral-frame counterparts for either the universal- or
conditional-exit treatments.
While the increase in exit rates under the health frame produced results more consistent
with our underlying theoretical model, it is difficult to know what precisely might be driving
these framing effects, beyond the fact they were induced by the framing change itself. While
the decisions were framed as health-related choices, our experiment did not include any health
consequences beyond those in situations in which untreated health care issues result in lost
income due to an illness. This differs from both the real world, and alternative experimental
designs that have been adopted in which subject decisions have real health-care related
consequences for patients outside the lab (e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2011). However our
framing results show that such health-care related consequences are not necessary to induce a
change in behavior. Because investigating the impact of a health versus a neutral investment
frame was not the primary goal of this study, we view these findings as preliminary and
deserving of further investigation.
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7 Conclusion
This paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test theoretical predications regarding
mixed public and private financing for a private good that allows for exit from the public
system, similar to financing of health care in countries such as Germany. In such systems,
individuals who choose to exit the public system neither contribute to its financing nor
consume any of the publicly provided health care, but instead purchase health care privately.
We investigated two exit designs: a universal-exit scheme in which everyone is eligible to
exit, and a conditional-exit scheme in which only high-income individuals are eligible to exit.
Our results largely confirm the theoretical predictions regarding exit behavior under the
conditional-exit design. Both exit rates by high-income individuals and the amounts of
private purchases accord well with the theoretical predictions. In contrast, our results are
not consistent with the prediction that, under universal-exit, support for public provision
will unravel. High-income individuals in the universal-exit treatment did not exit as much as
predicted; and conditional on many high-income individuals remaining in the public system,
it was then rational for lower-income individuals to also remain (to benefit from the income
redistribution carried out through public provision).
A key question is why high-income individuals failed to exit as predicted in the universal-
exit treatment but did exit largely as predicted under conditional-exit. Additional sessions
using modified designs to test some specific conjectures regarding this unexpected behavior
found that this exit behavior was not related to other-regarding preferences among subjects.
Low rates of exit in the universal-exit treatment could have been due to the fact that this
treatment presented the public system as the default option from which one had to actively
choose to exit, and it was not obvious whether such exit was socially approved. In con-
trast, the conditional-exit treatment explicitly and uniquely gave high-income individuals
the option to exit. Importantly, priming the universal-exit treatment with 10 periods of the
conditional-exit treatment changed behavior: high-income individuals now recognized the
value of exit, causing them to exit at higher rates, and once others recognized that the high
income individuals were exiting they followed. Although this resulted in significantly more
exit than in the unprimed universal-exit treatment, there were still individuals who could
have, but did not exit. Even when holding incomes constant and providing full information
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regarding the income levels of those subjects who exited, subjects did not totally abandon
the public system as predicted.
We also tested a version of the public-only, universal-exit and conditional-exit treatments
using an explicit health care frame. In the health frame, for conditional exit we observed exit
rates comparable to those in the non-health frame, but for the universal-exit treatment we
observed exit rates higher than in the non-health frame. These higher exit rates under the
health frame in the universal-exit treatment are more consistent with the predictions from
our theoretical model. Our design did not allow us to identify what about the health care
frame drove this result. This is an important question for future health-related experiments
to investigate in greater detail.20
Our results have a number of potential policy implications pertaining to health care
financing, health care consumption, and overall benefits.21 The results from our main design
support the predictions for a public-only system of health care financing. If the individuals
participating in this environment were given the opportunity to vote on replacing a private-
only health care system by a publicly financed system, the individuals in the three lower
quintiles of the income distribution would be better off by replacing the private-only system.22
These results support what is typically expected from a policy that replaces private provision
with tax-financed uniform public provision.
When universal-exit was offered to the individuals in the public-only environment, over
half of the individuals in the top four quintiles chose to exit. This exit causes the level of
public provision to fall and the amount available to the people in the lower three quintiles
to be less than the amount of public provision available to them in the public-only system.23
When our universal-exit sessions were framed as health care an even larger percentage of
individuals in the top four quintiles chose to exit, leading to an even greater reduction in
publicly provided health care and health care consumption by the individuals in the lower
20It would also be interesting to compare exit behavior under health care frames with that for other sector
frames, such as education.
21We draw these implications based on the results presented in Tables 6 and 7, which were obtained in
the investment frame in which the collective good was not identified as health care. However, given the
tax rates and exit rates observed subsequently in the health care frame, the implications carry over in a
straightforward way to health care environments.
22As seen in Table 7.
23As shown in Table 6.
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three income quintiles. The only individuals who ultimately benefit from universal-exit
compared to public-only are those in the highest-income quintile. This is also true under
conditional exit, although those in the second highest income quintile are no worse off in this
type of mixed financing system.
As only the individuals in the highest income quintile benefit by moving from a public-
only system to systems that include universal- or conditional-exit options, we would expect
that neither of the exit environments would be preferred by a majority of individuals who had
knowledge of all three environments. With experience in the conditional- and universal-exit
environments, the individuals in the upper three quintiles would prefer a system of private
health care to either of the exit environments.24
If majority-rule voting were the collective choice mechanism used to select among pure
private finance, pure public finance, and mixed public and private financing with an exit
option, then both theoretically and empirically purely publicly financed health care would
be selected by a majority of individuals. To the extent that our environment captures the
naturally occurring environment, the existence of a public financing system of health care
with an exit option would not arise through majority-rule voting that is fully representative
of the people in the environment.
Our findings also suggest a number of other useful directions for future research on mixed
systems of health care finance. First, we used an income condition for the conditional-
exit treatment. It would be interesting to see if the same pattern of results hold when an
occupation condition is used instead, as is the case in some systems that allow exit. Second,
it would be informative to run a design in which, rather than give people the opportunity
to exit from a public system (which serves as the baseline), give them opportunity to enter
into the collective provision of the private good from a baseline of pure private provision.
And finally, future research should explore the impact of modified assumptions regarding, for
example, differences in transaction costs between public and private consumption, differences
in uncertainty associated with public provision compared to private consumption and the
public provision of a private health care good with positive externalities (such as result from
vaccinations against infectious diseases).
24Tables 6 and 7 provide predictions for a private-only system.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Experimental Design
Session Type Treatment for Treatment for Session Notes Number of
Periods 1 to 10 Periods 11 to 20 Subjects
Main Design
1 Public-Only Universal-Exit Neutral framing 25
2 Universal-Exit Public-Only Neutral framing 25
3 Public-Only Conditional-Exit Neutral framing 25
4 Conditional-Exit Public-Only Neutral framing 25
5 Conditional-Exit Universal-Exit Neutral framing 30
6 Public-Only Universal-Exit Neutral framing, 30
Constant incomes
Sensitivity 7 Public-Only Universal-Exit Neutral framing, 30
Analysis Constant incomes,
Told who exited
8 Public-Only Universal-Exit Health framing 25
9 Public-Only Conditional-Exit Health framing 25
Table 2: Exit and Private Purchases Decisions, Universal-Exit Treatment
Predicted Observed
Percentage Private Percentage Mean Private
Income of Exits Purchases, L$ of Exits Purchases, L$
125 n/a 69.96 8% 82
275 100% 153.8 16%∗ 171.13
640 100% 357.94 56%∗ 358.29
700 100% 391.5 72%∗ 370.57
1500 100% 838.93 76%∗ 793.29
Notes: ∗ indicates that the observed value is statistically significantly different from its predicted value at
the 10% level of significance.
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Table 3: Exit and Private Purchases Decisions, Conditional-Exit Treatment
Predicted Observed
Percentage Private Percentage Mean Private
Income of Exits Purchases, L$ of Exits Purchases, L$
700 100% 391.5 94%∗ 361.47∗
1500 100% 838.93 94%∗ 752.68∗
Notes: See notes for Table 2.
Table 4: Mean Preferred Tax Rates by Income and Treatment
Predicted Rates Observed Mean Rates
Conditional- Public-Only Universal- Public-Only Conditional-
Income Public-Only Exit w/ Univ Exit Exit w/ Cond Exit Exit
125 0.937 0.854 0.856∗ 0.809 0.857∗ 0.821∗
275 0.821 0.642 0.776U,∗ 0.680P 0.761C,∗ 0.660P
640 0.564 0.336 0.545 0.474C 0.549C 0.383P,U,∗
700 0.531 n/a 0.527∗ 0.509 0.507∗ 0.627
1500 0.265 n/a 0.288U,∗ 0.426P,C 0.292 0.750U
Notes: All statistical tests are conducted using a 10% significance level. ∗ indicates that the observed value
is significantly different from its predicted value. P denotes a statistically significant difference between
the universal-exit or conditional-exit value and associated public-only value. U(C) denotes a statistically
significant difference between the treatment value to which the superscript is attached and the corresponding
observed universal-exit (conditional-exit) value. There are 20 observations for the public-only treatment for
all endowment levels. There are 10, 10, 8, 8 and 7 observations for the universal-exit treatment endowments
of 125, 275, 640, 700 and 1500, respectively and 10, 10, 10, 3 and 3 observations for the conditional-exit
treatment endowments of 125, 275, 640, 700 and 1500, respectively. The mean observed preferred tax rate
of the highest-income subject in the exit treatment (0.426) is significantly different from the mean observed
preferred rate of the highest-income subject in the conditional-exit treatment (0.750) using a t-test, but is
not significantly different using a Mann-Whitney test.
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Table 5: Mean Implemented Tax Rates by Treatment
Public-Only Universal- Public-Only Conditional-
(w/ Universal-Exit) Exit (w/ Conditional-Exit) Exit
Predicted Rate 0.564 n/a 0.564 0.642
Observed Mean
Implemented Rate 0.559U 0.664P 0.562C 0.655P
(Std Dev) (0.028) (0.046) (0.019) (0.043)
Observations 10 10 10 10
Notes: See notes for Table 4. In the universal-exit treatment, the individual with endowment of 125 will
be indifferent between exiting or remaining in the public system. In the case when the individual does not
exit, the individual’s preferred tax rate is 0.559. The observed mean implemented tax rate of 0.664 in the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Observed Percentage (Frequency) of Exits per period by Treatment and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Universal-Exit Universal-Exit Universal-Exit
Conditional- Universal- following with Constant Incomes
Income Exit Exit Conditional-Exit Constant Incomes Told Who Exited
125 0% (0) 8% (4) 16% (5) 7% (2) 24% (7)
275 0% (0) 16% (8) 60%? (18) 50%? (15) 69% (20)
640 0% (0) 56% (28) 80%? (24) 80%? (24) 72% (21)
700 88% (70) 72%γ (36) 87%$ (26) 80% (24) 86% (25)
1500 96% (77) 76%γ (38) 93%?,$ (28) 100%?,$ (30) 97%$ (28)
N 80 50 30 30 29
Note: N indicates the number of observations per income value for each treatment. γ indicate that the
percentage of exits for the two highest income levels is significantly different from the percent of exits in
Column (1) at the 10% significance level. ? indicates the percentage of exits in Column (3) and in Column
(4) that are significantly different from the percent of exits in Column (2) at the 10% significance level. None
of the observed frequencies in Columns (3) and (4) and in Columns (4) and (5) are significantly different
from each other at a 10% significance level. All tests are t-tests computed using a clustered probit regression
model for each income value in which an exit dummy is regressed on the full set of treatment dummies and
errors are assumed to be clustered at the session level to account for correlation among exit decisions made
over time and across subjects within the same session. Finally, $ indicates that the percentage of exits is not
significantly different from 100% at the 10% significant level using a chi-square test.
35
Table 9: Mean Exit, Private Purchase and Implemented Tax Rate Decisions for Health
Frame Treatments
Universal-Exit Health Frame Conditional-Exit Health Frame
Income
Observed Observed Mean Observed Observed Mean
Percentage of Private Percentage of Private
Exits Purchases, L$ Exits Purchases, L$
125 0.16 70.17 - -
275 48%* 150.70 - -
640 92%* 346.33 - -
700 92%* 379.88 0.88 332.05
1500 92%* 794.79 0.96 692.98
Public-Only Universal-Exit Public-Only Conditional-
(w/ Universal- (w/ Conditional- Exit
-Exit Exit)
Observed Mean
0.552 0.645 0.483* 0.5512*Implemented Tax
Rate
Notes: * indicates that the observed value is statistically significantly different from its counterpart value in
the neutrally framed treatments at the 10% level of significance.
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